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Abstract
Ad exchanges are becoming an increasingly popular way to sell
advertisement slots on the internet. An ad exchange is basically a
spot market for ad impressions. A publisher who has already signed
contracts reserving advertisement impressions on his pages can choose
between assigning a new ad impression for a new page view to a con-
tracted advertiser or to sell it at an ad exchange. This leads to an
online revenue maximization problem for the publisher. Given a new
impression to sell decide whether (a) to assign it to a contracted ad-
vertiser and if so to which one or (b) to sell it at the ad exchange and
if so at which reserve price. We make no assumptions about the distri-
bution of the advertiser valuations that participate in the ad exchange
and show that there exists a simple primal-dual based online algorithm,
whose lower bound for the revenue converges to RADX +RA(1− 1/e),
where RADX is the revenue that the optimum algorithm achieves from
the ad exchange and RA is the revenue that the optimum algorithm
achieves from the contracted advertisers.
1 Introduction
The market for display ads on the internet is worth billions of dollars and
continues to rise. Not surprisingly, there are multiple ways of selling display
advertisements. Traditionally, publishers signed long-term contracts with
their advertisers, fixing the number of impressions, i.e. assigned ad slots
views, as well as their price. In the last few years, however, spot markets,
so called Ad Exchanges [1], have been developed, with Amazon, Ebay, and
Yahoo (to just name a few) all offering their own ad exchange. Thus, every
time a user requests to download a page from a publisher, the publisher
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needs to decide (a) which of the ad impressions on this page should be
assigned to which contracted advertiser, and (b) which should be sold at
the ad exchange and at which reserve price1.
Ad exchanges are interesting for publishers as (1) basically an unlim-
ited number of ad impressions can be sold at ad exchanges, and (2) if the
publishers have additional information about the user, they might sell an
impression at a much higher price at the ad exchange than they could receive
from their contracted advertisers. As ad impressions that did not receive a
bid at or above the reserve price at the ad exchange can still be assigned
to contracted advertisers, a revenue-maximizing publisher can offer every ad
impression first at an ad exchange at a “high enough” reserve price and then
afterwards assign the still unsold impressions to contracted advertisers. The
question for the advertiser becomes, thus, (i) what reserve price to choose,
and (ii) to which advertisers to assign the unsold impressions. We model
this setting as an online problem and achieve the following two results: If
the revenue achievable by the ad exchange for each ad impression is known,
we give a constant competitive algorithm. Then we show how to convert
this algorithm into a second algorithm that works in the setting where the
revenue achievable from the ad exchange is not known. Assume that the
auction executed at the ad exchange fulfills the following property P : If
an ad impression is sold at the ad exchange, then the revenue achieved is
independent of the reserve price chosen by the publisher. Thus, the reserve
price influences only whether the ad impression is sold, not the price that is
achieved. For example, a first price auction with reserve prices fulfills this
condition. If the auction at the ad exchange fulfills this condition, then our
second algorithm is constant competitive when compared with the optimum
offline algorithm.
When modeling contracted advertisers we use the model with free dis-
posal introduced in [2]: Each advertiser a comes with a number na and the
revenue that an algorithm receives from a consists of the na most valuable
ad impressions assigned to a. Additional impressions assigned to a do not
generate any revenue.
More formally we define the following Online Ad Assignment Problem
with Free Disposal and an Ad Exchange. There is a set of contracted adver-
tisers A and an ad exchange α. Each advertiser a comes with a number na
of ad impressions such that a pays only for the na most valuable ad impres-
sions assigned to a, or for all assigned ad impressions if fewer than na are
1The reserve price is the minimum required price at which an impression is sold at an
ad auction. If no offer is at or above the reserve price, the impression is not sold.
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assigned to a. To simplify the notation we set nα = ∞. Now a finite se-
quence S = S0, S1, . . . of sets Sl with l = 0, 1, . . . , of ad impressions arrives
in order. When Sl arrives, the weights wi,a for each i ∈ Sl and a ∈ A ∪ {α}
are revealed and the online algorithm has to assign each i ∈ Sl before fur-
ther sets Sl+1, Sl+2, etc. arrive. Let A : I → A ∪ {α} be an assignment of
impressions to advertisers. An assignment is valid if no two impressions in
the same set Sl are assigned to the same advertiser a ∈ A. Let IA(a) be
the set of the na highest weighted impressions assigned to advertiser a by
A. Then the revenue R(A) of A is
∑
a∈A∪{α}
∑
i∈IA(a)
wi,a. The goal of
the algorithm is to produce a valid assignment A with maximum revenue
R(A). The competitive ratio of an online algorithm is the minimum over all
sequences S of the ratio of the revenue achieved by the online algorithm on
S and the revenue achieved by the optimal offline algorithm on S, where
the latter algorithm is given all of S before it makes the first decision.
Feldman et al. [2] studied a special case of our problem, namely the
setting without an ad exchange and where each set Sl has size one, i.e. where
the impressions arrive consecutively. For that setting they gave a primal-
dual based 0.5 competitive algorithm whose competitive ratio converges to
(1−1/e) ratio when all the na values go to infinity. More precisely let nA =
mina∈A na. Then their algorithm is 1 − (
nA
nA+1
)nA-competitive. They also
showed that this ratio is tight when considering deterministic algorithms [2].
Let Ra for an advertiser a ∈ A ∪ {α} be the revenue that the optimal
algorithm receives from a. We extend their results in several ways. (1) We
consider a setting with one advertiser, called ad exchange, that has infinite
capacity2. Moreover, we allow multiple ad slots on a page, with the condition
that no two can be assigned to the same advertiser, i.e. for us |Sl| can be
larger than 1. (2) The revenue of our algorithm depends directly on the na
value, not on nA. More precisely, if no ad exchange exists, our algorithm
receives a revenue of at least
∑
a(1− (
na
na+1
)na)Ra. When an ad exchange is
added, our algorithm achieves a revenue of at least Rα+
∑
a(1−(
na
na+1
)na)Ra.
(3) We show how to modify our algorithm for the setting where wi,α is
unknown for all i. In this setting our algorithm computes a reserve price
and sends every impression first to the ad exchange. The reserve price is set
such that if the auction executed at the ad exchange fulfills property P then
the above revenue bounds continue to hold, i.e. it achieves a revenue of at
least Rα +
∑
a(1− (
na
na+1
)na)Ra.
2It is straightforward to extend the algorithm and its analysis to multiple ad exchanges.
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Techniques Our algorithm is a modification of the standard primal-dual
algorithms in [2] but it is itself not a standard primal-dual algorithms as
it does not construct a feasible primal and dual solution to a single LP.
Instead in the analysis we use several primal and dual LPs, one for each
advertiser a and use the dual solutions to upper bound Ra. However, the
corresponding primal feasible solution is not directly related to the revenue
the algorithm achieves from a. Instead, the solution constructed by the
algorithm is a feasible solution for a primal program that is the combination
of all individual LPs. This property is strong enough to give the claimed
bounds. The crucial new ideas in our algorithms are (i) the observation that
when deciding to whom an ad slot is assigned the publisher should be biased
towards advertiser with large na and in particular towards the ad exchange
and (ii) that based on the structure of the algorithm it can be easily modified
to compute an reserve price for the auction in the ad exchange if the wi,α
values are unknown.
Further Related Work We describe prior work on the question whether
the publisher should assign an impression to a contracted advertiser or an
ad exchange. In [3] a scenario is studied, where the wi,a follow a joint
distribution and no disposal is allowed. Gosh et al. [4] assume that for each
impression i the wi,α values follow a known distribution and the contracted
advertisers have a quality value depending on wi,α. They study the trade-
off between the quality of the impressions assigned to the advertisers and
revenue from the ad exchange. The work in [5], like our work, does not make
Bayesian assumptions but studies online algorithms in the worst case setting.
The main difference to our work is that there the contracted advertisers also
arrive online and that there is no free disposal.
Finally, Devanur et al. [6] extend [2] to the scenario with multiple ad
slots on a page and constraints on ads being assigned together, but they
neither consider ad-exchanges nor consider the different capacities na in the
competitive ratio.
Structure of the paper In Section 2 we discuss why the algorithm
from [2] is not satisfying in our setting and present a simple online algo-
rithm for the 1-slot case, which we improve in Section 3 to achieve a revenue
of at least Rα +
∑
a(1 − (
na
na+1
)na)Ra. In Section 4 we generalize this algo-
rithm to the multi-slot setting. Finally, in Section 5 we show how to adapt
it if the wi,α values are unknown.
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Algorithm 1
1. Initialize βa = 0, βα = 0
2. When impression i arrives
(a) Compute j = argmax
a∈A∪{α}
{wi,a − βa}.
(b) if j = α then set xi,α = 1 and zi = wi,α.
(c) if j ∈ A then set xi,j = 1, ∀ i
′ 6= i : xi′,j = 0, zi = wi,j − βj and
βj = wi,j.
2 A Simple 1-Slot Online Algorithm
In Sections 2 and 3 we consider algorithms for the 1-slot setting, i.e., where
each Sl just contains a single impression i. Given an instance of such an
online ad assignment problem we can build an equivalent instance where all
capacities na = 1. Simply replace each advertiser a by na copies a1, . . . ana
with the capacities 1 and for each impression i set wi,ap = wi,a for all 1 ≤
p ≤ na. Thus in this section we assume na = 1 for each a ∈ A. Then we
formulate the offline problem as an integer linear program (ILP), where the
variable xi,a is set to 1 if i is assigned to advertiser a and to 0, otherwise.
Primal: max
∑
i,a∈A∪{α}
wi,a xi,a
∑
a∈A∪{α}
xi,a ≤ 1 ∀i
∑
i
xi,a ≤ 1 ∀a ∈ A
The first type of constraints ensures that each impression is assigned to at
most one advertiser, while the second type of constraints ensures that each
a ∈ A is assigned at most one impression. It has the following dual LP.
Dual: min
∑
i
zi +
∑
a∈A
βa
zi + βa ≥ wi,a ∀i,∀a ∈ A
zi ≥ wi,α ∀i
For notational convenience we assume an additional variable βα which
remains 0 for the whole algorithm. We next consider a straight forward
5
generalization of the online algorithm in [2], called Algorithm 1, to our
setting. This algorithm constructs a feasible integral solution for the Primal
LP, corresponding to an ad assignment, and a feasible solution for the dual
LP that is used to upper bound the revenue of the optimal assignment.
Algorithm 1 constructs feasible solutions for both the Primal and the
Dual: when impression i is assigned to advertiser j then xi,j is set to 1, βj
is set to wi,j, and zi is set to maxa∈A∪{α}{wi,a − βa}. Note that the loss
in revenue of Algorithm 1 compared to the optimal assignment exclusively
comes from the impression assigned to advertisers in A.
Proposition 1. Let A be an ad assignment computed by Algorithm 1, then
R(OPT ) ≤ Rα(A) + 2 · RA(A).
Proof. In the following we will use that R(A) equals the value of the pri-
mal solution and that the value of the dual solution is an upper bound on
R(OPT ). We prove the claim by induction on the assigned impressions.
Clearly the base case where no impression is assigned is fine. Now consider
an arbitrary i to be assigned and notice that, by (1.), βa is such that βa = 0
if no impression was assigned to a. Otherwise, by (2c), βa = wi′,a where i
′
is the highest weighted impression assigned to a. We simultaneously con-
sider the increase of the primal and the dual solution when adding a new
impression i.
If Algorithm 1 assigns i to an a ∈ A this is by rule (c). Let βna , β
o
a be the
new and old value of βa. The statement xi,a = 1, ∀ i
′ 6= i : xi′,a = 0 increases
the revenue R(A) by wi,a − β
o
a, as β
o
a is the value wi′,a of the impression i
′
we have to drop. On the other side the statement zi = wi,a − β
o
a increases
the objective of the Dual by the same amount. Additionally the objective
of the Dual is affected by updating βa with β
n
a = wi,a. This additionally
increases the objective of the Dual by βna − β
o
a = wi,a − β
o
a. Thus, if i is
assigned to an a ∈ A, the increase of the objective of the Dual is twice the
increase of the objective of the primal, the revenue R(A).
If Algorithm 1 assigns i to α this is by rule (b). By xi,α = 1 we increase
the revenue by wi,α and by setting zi = wi,α we increase the objective of the
Dual by the same amount. Hence, as in case (b) the βa are not affected, we
obtain that R(OPT ) ≤ Rα(A) + 2 ·RA(A).
However, the Algorithm 1 does not guarantee that impressions are sent
to ad exchange when the optimal algorithm does. Thus the optimal offline
assignment might send many impressions to the ad exchange, while the
online assignment of the above algorithm does not and thus might only be
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Algorithm 2
1. Initialize βa = 0 for all a ∈ A ∪ {α}
2. When impression i arrives
(a) Compute j = argmax
a∈A
{wi,a − βa}.
(b) if (wi,j − βj) > 2 · wi,α then assign i to j and set βj = wi,j.
(c) if (wi,j − βj) ≤ 2 · wi,α then assign i to α.
an 1/2 approximation (Proposition 1 guarantees that it is not worse.). Such
a situation is given in Example 1.
Example 1. Consider A = {a} with na = 1 and impressions 1 ≤ i ≤ n with
wi,α = 1 − ǫ and wi,a = i. Then the revenue R(A) of Algorithm 1 after n
impressions is n, while the optimal assignment achieves n+ (n − 1)(1 − ǫ),
where (n− 1)(1− ǫ) is achieved by the ad exchange. For ǫ→ 0 and n→∞
the ratio R(A)/R(OPT ) is 1/2 although half of the revenue in the optimal
assignment OPT comes from the ad exchange. ♦
Thus the algorithm from [2] is only 1/2-competitive, even when an ad
exchange, i.e., an advertiser with infinite capacity, is added.
Given an ad assignment A let Rα(A) denote the revenue the assignment
gets from impressions assigned to the ad exchange and let RA(A) denote the
revenue the assignment gets from impressions assigned to contracted adver-
tisers. Thus we have R(A) = Rα(A)+RA(A). Additionally, we use OPT to
denote the optimal assignment. We present next Algorithm 2, an online al-
gorithm that receives as revenue at least Rα(OPT )+ (1/2)Ra(OPT ), which
is already an improvement over Algorithm 1. It is based on the observation
that assigning an impression that should be sent to the ad exchange to an
advertiser in A is worse than sending an impression that should go to an
advertiser in A to the ad exchange. Thus, the algorithm is biased towards
the ad exchange. Specifically the algorithm assigns an impression to an
advertiser a ∈ A only if it gives at least double the revenue on a than on α.
Theorem 1. Let A be the ad assignment computed by Algorithm 2 then
R(A) ≥ Rα(OPT ) + 1/2 · RA(OPT ).
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2.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Let IAOPT , resp. I
α
OPT , be the impressions assigned to A, resp. α, by the
optimal (offline) assignment OPT. 3 We give an LP PA for the advertisers
A and impressions IAOPT and its dual DA such that any feasible solution for
DA gives an upper bound dA for RA(OPT ).
Primal PA: max
∑
i∈IA
OPT
,a∈A
wi,a xi,a
∑
a∈A
xi,a ≤ 1 ∀i∈I
A
OPT
∑
i∈IA
OPT
xi,a ≤ 1 ∀a∈A
Dual DA: min
∑
i∈IA
OPT
zi +
∑
a∈A
βa
zi + βa ≥ wi,a ∀i∈I
A
OPT ∀a∈A
Note that the summation in PA and the constraints in DA are only over
impressions in IAOPT . The objective value of the optimal solution of DA,
is an upper bound for the objective of PA, and thus also for RA(OPT ).
However, there is no direct relationship between RA(A) and the objective
of PA for A, as A might also assign impressions from I
α
OPT to A.
To upper bound RA(OPT ) we construct a feasible solution for DA. We
do this in a iterative fashion, that is whenever Algorithm 2 assigns an im-
pression i ∈ IAOPT we update the feasible solution for DA as follows:
(i) For the βa variables we use the values currently set by the Algorithm 2;
(ii) For the variable zi we set zi = wi,j − β
o
j , where β
o
a is the value of βa
before i is assigned.
As wi,j − β
o
j = maxa∈A{wi,a − βa}, all the constraints for i are satisfied.
Hence, doing this for all i ∈ IAOPT gives a feasible solution for DA and its
objective dA fulfills dA ≥ RA(OPT ).
To show that the claim holds after each assignment of an impression i
we investigate assigning one expression i and study the effect to both the
upper bound and the revenue we achieve. To this end we introduce some
notation:
• ∆dA(i) is the increase of the objective dA when the algorithm assigns
impression i, i.e., the change in dA caused by the change in the β-values
and the assignment of the new zi value (if i ∈ I
A
OPT ).
3In case there are several optimal assignments we pick an arbitrary one.
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• ∆dα(i) = wi,α if i ∈ I
α
OPT and ∆dα(i) = 0 otherwise.
• ∆R(A, i) is the increase of the revenue when assigning i.
• βna , resp. β
o
a, to denote the value of βa after, resp. before i is assigned
Note that by the definitions (a)
∑
i∈I ∆dA(i) = dA, (b)
∑
i∈I ∆dα(i) =
Rα(OPT ) and (c)
∑
i∈I ∆R(A, i) = R(A). We will also exploit the fact
that βa is such that βa = 0 if no impression was assigned to a and otherwise
βa = wi′,a, where i
′ is the impression currently assigned to a.
Next, to relate the increase of the upper bound with the gain of revenue,
we distinguish whether one assigns an impression i ∈ IαOPT or an impression
i ∈ IAOPT
Lemma 1. ∆R(A, i) ≥ ∆dα(i) + 1/2 ·∆dA(i), for i ∈ I
A
OPT .
Proof. As i ∈ IAOPT , by definition, we have ∆dα(i) = 0. Thus, we actually
have to show that ∆R(A, i) ≥ 1/2 ·∆dA(i).
1. If Algorithm 2 assigns i to an j ∈ A recall that we set zi = wi,j − β
o
j
and the algorithm sets βnj = wi,j. Thus ∆dA(i) = 2 · (wi,j − β
o
j ) and
∆R(A, i) is given by wi,j minus the value of the impression we have
to drop (if any), given by β0a. As this values is stored in β
o
j we get
∆R(A, i) = wi,j − β
o
j and thus ∆R(A, i) ≥ 1/2 ·∆dA(i).
2. If Algorithm 2 assigns i to α (although OPT does not), we know from
Step 2c that (wi,j − βj) ≤ 2wi,α, where j = argmax
a∈A
{wi,a − βa}. As
we set zi = wi,j − β
o
j and the algorithm keeps all βa unchanged we get
∆dA(i) = wi,j − β
o
j and as we assign i to α we have ∆R(A, i) = wi,α.
Thus ∆R(A, i) = wi,α ≥ 1/2 · (wi,j − βj) = 1/2 ·∆dA(i).
Hence, ∆R(A, i) ≥ 1/2 ·∆dA(i) = ∆dα(i) + 1/2 ·∆dA(i).
Lemma 2. ∆R(A, i) ≥ ∆dα(i) + 1/2 ·∆dA(i), for i ∈ I
α
OPT .
Proof. As i ∈ IαOPT , by definition, ∆dα(i) = wi,α. Recall that no z-value is
affected in this case. We have to show that ∆R(A, i) ≥ wi,α + 1/2 ·∆dA(i).
1. If Algorithm 2 assigns i to the ad exchange then the βa are not changed.
Thus ∆dA(i) = 0 and ∆R(A, i) is simply wi,α. Hence, ∆R(A, i) =
wi,α ≥ wi,α + 1/2 ·∆dA(i).
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2. If Algorithm 2 assigns i to an a ∈ A we have (wi,a − β
o
a) > 2wi,α and
the algorithm sets βna = wi,a. Thus ∆dA(i) = wi,a − β
o
a. Furthermore,
∆R(A, i) is given by wi,a minus the value of the impression we have
to drop (if any), given by β0a. Thus ∆R(A, i) = (wi,a − β
o
a) = 1/2 ·
(wi,a − β
o
a) + 1/2 · (wi,a − β
o
a) ≥ wi,α + 1/2 ·∆dA(i).
Hence, ∆R(A, i) ≥ wi,α + 1/2 ·∆dA(i) = ∆dα(i) + 1/2 ·∆dA(i).
When combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 we obtain that for each i ∈ I:
∆R(A, i) ≥ ∆dα(i) + 1/2 ·∆dA(i).
Finally, when summing over all impression i ∈ I and using the above
inequality we obtain the claim.
R(A)=
∑
i∈I
∆R(A, i) ≥
∑
i∈I
(
∆dα(i)+
∆dA(i)
2
)
≥ Rα(OPT )+
RA(OPT )
2
.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
3 An Online 1-Slot Algorithm Exploiting High Ca-
pacities
In this section we generalize the result from Section 2 to the setting where
each advertiser a ∈ A has an individual limit na for the number of ad
impressions he is willing to pay for and we present Algorithm 3 that achieves
an improvement in revenue for advertisers a with large na.
In Algorithm 3 we consider variables βa which, for a ∈ A, are always set s.t.
βa =
1
na(ena − 1)
na∑
j=1
wj
(
1 +
1
na
)j−1
(1)
where the wj ’s are the weights of the impressions assigned to a in non-
increasing order and ena = (1+1/na)
na . That is, βa stores a weighted mean
of the na most valuable impressions assigned to a. Again we keep βα=0 in
the whole algorithm. Next we consider how assigning a new impression to
a affects βa.
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Lemma 3. Consider a new impression i being assigned to advertiser a. Let
βoa, resp. β
n
a denote the value of βa before, resp. after i was assigned and v
the value of the impression dropped from βa (0 if no impression is dropped),
then
βna − β
o
a ≤
βoa
na
−
v · ena
na(ena − 1)
+
wi,a
na(ena − 1)
.
Lemma 3 was already shown in [2] but to keep the paper self-explanatory
we provide a proof.
Proof. Assume that wi,a is the impression with the k-th highest value.
βna =
1
na(ena−1)

k−1∑
j=1
wj
(
1+
1
na
)j−1
+ wi,a
(
1+
1
na
)k−1
+
na−1∑
j=k
wj
(
1+
1
na
)j
≤
1
na(ena−1)

wi,a + na−1∑
j=1
wj
(
1+
1
na
)j
To obtain the inequality we exploited that wj > wi,a for j < k and that
(1 + 1/na)
j−1 < (1 + 1/na)
j′−1 for j < j′. We proceed with standard trans-
formations.
βna ≤
1
na(ena−1)

wi,a + na−1∑
j=1
wj
(
1+
1
na
)j
=
wi,a
na(ena−1)
+
1
na(ena−1)
na−1∑
j=1
wj
(
1+
1
na
)j
=
wi,a
na(ena−1)
+
(
1 +
1
na
)
βoa −
v · ena
na(ena − 1)
From the last statement we obtain βna −β
o
a ≤
βoa
na
− v·ena
na(ena−1)
+
wi,a
na(ena−1)
.
Notice that in Algorithm 3 for each a ∈ A we have that 1/2 ≤ ca <
1−1/e, i.e. for na = 1 we have ca = 1/2 and ca grows with na and converges
to 1− 1/e. The idea is to bias the algorithm towards advertisers with larger
na and in particular towards the ad-exchange.
We use Ra(A) for a ∈ A ∪ {α} to denote the revenue the assignment A
gets from advertiser a. Thus, R(A) =
∑
a∈A∪{α} Ra(A).
Theorem 2. Let A be the assignment computed by Algorithm 3 then R(A) ≥∑
a∈A∪{α} ca · Ra(OPT ).
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Algorithm 3
1. Initialize βa = 0 for all a ∈ A ∪ {α}
2. When impression i arrives
(a) Compute x = argmax
a∈A∪{α}
{ca · (wi,a − βa)}
(b) assign i to x and update βx according to (1)
where weights ca are defined as ca =
{
1− 1
ena
a ∈ A
1 a = α
Theorem 2 will be a direct consequence of Theorem 3, which we will
prove in the next section.
Finally let us briefly discuss whether the constants ca are chosen opti-
mally. From a result in [7] on online algorithms for b-matchings it follows
immediately that the constants ca in Theorem 2 are optimal for determinis-
tic algorithms. Moreover, in [8] it is shown that even randomized algorithms
cannot achieve a better competitive ratio than (1−1/e) 4. So for large values
of na even randomized algorithms cannot improve over Algorithm 3.
4 A Multi-Slot Online Algorithm
In practice publishers often have several ad slots at a single page and want
to avoid to show multiple ads from the same advertiser on the same page
to avoid annoying their users. This can be modeled as follows: A sequence
S = S0, S1, . . . of sets of impressions arrive in an online manner. Each set
S has be assigned (a) before any future sets have arrived, and (b) such that
non two impressions in S are assigned to the same advertiser in A. Note that
we allow multiple impressions from S to be assigned to the ad exchange as
we expect the ad exchange to return different advertisers for them. Let the
set of all impressions I =
∑
S∈S S. With Algorithm 4 we present an online
algorithm for this setting with the same competitive ratio as Algorithm 3.
Note, however, that, unlike Algorithm 3, it is compared to the optimal
offline solution that respects the above restriction. More formally, we call
a function a : S → A ∪ {α} assigning impressions S to advertisers valid
4In [8] the authors study the Adwords problem but in [2] it is argued that the given
example can be also be interpreted as Online Ad Assignment problem.
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Algorithm 4
1. Initialize βa = 0 for all a ∈ A ∪ {α}
2. When impressions S = {i1, . . . , il} arrive
(a) Compute b = argmax
valid a
{∑
i∈S
ca(i) · (wi,a(i) − βa(i))
}
(b) assign each i to b(i) and, if b(i) ∈ A, update βb(i) according to
(1).
where weights ca are defined as ca =
{
1− 1
ena
a ∈ A
1 a = α
if there are no i, i′ ∈ S, i 6= i′, a ∈ A such that a(i) = a(i′) = a. Our
Algorithm 4 generates a valid assignment and is compared to the revenue of
the valid assignment generated by the optimal offline algorithm. Notice that
the computation of argmax in Algorithm 4 is a weighted bipartite matching
problem and thus can be computed efficiently.
Recall that Ra(OPT ) for a ∈ A ∪ {α} is the revenue that an optimal
assignment generates from advertiser a. We show the following performance
bound.
Theorem 3. Let A be the assignment computed by Algorithm 4 and OPT
the optimal multi-slot ad assignment, then R(A) ≥
∑
a∈A∪{α} ca ·Ra(OPT ).
The proof of Theorem 3 generalizes ideas from the proof of Theorem 1.
One of the main difference is that we now have to deal with several sets
IaOPT instead of just one set I
A
OPT and thus also with several LPs.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 3
First we give a linear program Pa and its dual Da for each a ∈ A such that
the final objective value of any feasible solution of Da is an upper bound
of Ra(OPT ). Note, that there is no direct relationship between the final
objective values of the Pa’s and the revenue of the algorithm. However, we
are able to construct a feasible solution for each Da with objective value
da such that the revenue R(A) of the algorithm is at least
∑
a∈A∪α ca · da.
Together with the observation that da ≥ Ra(OPT ) and a bound dα on
Rα(OPT ) this proves the theorem.
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Let IaOPT be the impressions assigned to a ∈ A ∪ {α} by the optimal
(offline) assignment OPT. We consider the following LPs for each a ∈ A.
Primal Pa: max
∑
i∈Ia
OPT
wi,a xi,a
xi,a ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I
a
OPT∑
i∈Ia
OPT
xi,a ≤ na
Dual Da: min
∑
i∈Ia
OPT
zi + naβa
zi + βa ≥ wi,a ∀i ∈ I
a
OPT
Note that the summation in the primal and the constraints in the Dual
are only over the impressions in IaOPT , i.e., the impressions assigned to a
by OPT. The objective value of the optimal solution for Da is an upper
bound for the objective of Pa, and thus also for Ra(OPT ). This implies
that any feasible solution of Da, also the one we construct next, gives an
upper bound for Ra(OPT ). As there might be impressions assigned to a
by the algorithm that do not belong to IaOPT , the objective value of Pa is,
however, not necessarily related to Ra(A).
Next, we give a feasible solution for Da for all a ∈ A, as follows.
(i) For the βa variables we use the values currently set by the Algorithm 4;
(ii) Let a be the assignment of the impressions in S by the optimal solution.
For each i ∈ I, we set zi = wi,a(i) − βa(i) exactly when the algorithm
assigns i.
Note that this results in a feasible dual solution for all a as each i belongs to
exactly one set I
a(i)
OPT and zi is chosen exactly so as to make the solution of
Da(i) feasible, together with the current βa(i) values. As βa(i) only increases
in the course of the algorithm the solution remains feasible at the end of
the algorithm. Let da be the value of this feasible solution for Da for some
a ∈ A then we have da ≥ Ra(OPT ).
To show that the claim holds after each assignment of a set of impressions
S we investigate assigning one such set and study the effect to both the upper
bound and the revenue we achieve. To this end we introduce some notation:
• ∆da(S) be the increase of the objective value da when the algorithms
assigns S, i.e., the change in da caused by the change in the βa-values
and the assignment of the zi-values for all i ∈ S ∩ I
A
OPT .
• ∆dα(S) =
∑
i∈S∩Iα
OPT
wi,α.
• ∆R(A, S) is the increase of revenue when S is assigned.
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Note that by the definitions (a)
∑
S∈S ∆da(S) = da, (b)
∑
S∈S ∆dα(S) = dα
and (c)
∑
S∈S ∆R(A, S) = R(A).
Lemma 4. ∆R(A, S) ≥
∑
a∈A∪α
ca ·∆da(S), for all S ∈ S.
Proof. To simplify the notation let ∆d(S) =
∑
a∈A∪α ca ·∆da(S).
First consider ∆R(A, S): For a ∈ A let va be the value of the na-
th valuable impression assigned to a (the impression we would “drop” by
assigning a new one), and let vα = 0. If i is assigned to α then the gain
in revenue is wi,b(i) which equals wi,b(i) − vb(i). If i is assigned to a ∈ A
then the gain in revenue is the difference between the revenue of the new
impression and the impression we have to drop, i.e., again wi,b(i) − vb(i).
Thus for S altogether it holds
∆R(A, S) =
∑
i∈S
(wi,b(i) − vb(i))
Now consider ∆d(S): Recall that a is the assignment of the optimal
solution for the impressions S and let b be the assignment from Algorithm 4.
For all a ∈ A let βoa, β
n
a denote the value of βa right before, resp. right after
this assignment. Recall that for a = α, it holds that βa = 0 throughout the
algorithm. Now note that
∆d(S) =
∑
i∈S
(
ca(i) · (wi,a(i) − β
o
a(i)) + cb(i) · nb(i) · (β
n
b(i) − β
o
b(i))
)
,
where the first term comes from the new variables zi which we set to (wi,a(i)−
βo
a(i)), and the second term comes from the updates of βa. By the choice of
b in the algorithm we get
∆d(S) ≤
∑
i∈S
(
cb(i) · (wi,b(i) − β
o
b(i)) + cb(i) · nb(i) · (β
n
b(i) − β
o
b(i))
)
=
∑
i∈S
cb(i) ·
(
(wi,b(i) − β
o
b(i)) + nb(i) · (β
n
b(i) − β
o
b(i))
)
.
Next we bound the contribution of each i ∈ S separately by analyzing two
cases:
• If b(i) = α then we know that βo
b(i) = β
n
b(i) = vb(i) = 0 and cb(i) = 1 .
Thus
cb(i) ·
(
(wi,b(i) − β
o
b(i)) + cb(i) · nb(i) · (β
n
b(i) − β
o
b(i))
)
= (wi,b(i)−vb(i)).
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• If b(i) ∈ A then we can apply Lemma 3 to bound (βn
b(i) − β
o
b(i)) as
follows
cb(i) ·
(
(wi,b(i) − β
o
b(i)) + nb(i) · (β
n
b(i) − β
o
b(i))
)
≤
cb(i) ·
(
(wi,b(i) − β
o
b(i)) + β
o
b(i) −
vb(i) · enb(i)
enb(i) − 1
+
wi,b(i)
enb(i) − 1
)
=
cb(i) ·
(
wi,b(i) · enb(i)
enb(i) − 1
−
vb(i) · enb(i)
enb(i) − 1
)
= (wi,b(i) − vb(i))
In the last step we used that by definition ca = 1− 1/ena for a ∈ A. By the
above we obtain
∆d(S) ≤
∑
i∈S
(wi,b(i) − vb(i)) = ∆R(A, S).
Now consider that the set of impression is given by a series (Sj)0≤j≤n of
pairwise disjoint sets of impressions that show up simultaneously. Exploiting
Lemma 4 we get:
R(A) =
n∑
j=0
∆R(A, Sj) ≥
n∑
j=0
∆d(Sj) =
n∑
j=0
∑
a∈A∪{α}
ca ·∆da(Sj) ≥
∑
a∈A∪{α}
ca · Ra(OPT )
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
5 An Algorithm for Computing Reserve Prices
In our model we assumed the publisher knows exactly how much revenue
he can get from the ad exchange, i.e., the wi,α values are given for all i ∈ I.
The critical reader may interpose that this is not the fact in the real world
or in the ad exchange model proposed in [1]. Instead whenever sending an
impression to the ad exchange an auction is run. However, the publisher
can set a reserve price and if all the bids are below the reserve price then he
can still assign it to one of the contracted advertisers.
One nice property of Algorithms 2 & 3 is that they allow to compute the
minimal price we have to extract from the ad exchange such that it is better
to assign an impression to the ad exchange than to a contracted advertiser.
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This price is given by maxa∈A {ca · (wi,a − βa)}. It follows that this price
is also a natural choice for the reserve price. Assume the auction executed
at the ad exchange fulfills the following property (P): If an ad impression
is sold at the ad exchange, then the revenue achieved is independent of the
reserve price chosen by the publisher. Thus, the reserve price influences
only whether the ad impression is sold, not the price that is achieved. Then
Theorem 3 applies, i.e., the revenue of the algorithm is at least
∑
a∈A∪{α} ca ·
Ra(OPT ), even though the algorithm is not given the wi,α values and it
is compared to an optimal algorithm that does. The reason is that the
algorithm makes exactly the same decisions and receives exactly the same
revenue as Algorithm 3 that is given the wi,α values.
Theorem 4. Let A be the assignment computed by the Algorithm described
above, i.e., without knowledge of the wi,α values. If the auction at the ad
exchange fulfills property P, then R(A) ≥
∑
a∈A∪{α} ca ·Ra(OPT ).
However, this technique does not work for Algorithm 4. When a set of
impressions S is assigned the right reserve price for an impression i ∈ S
depends on the assignment of the other impressions in S. In particular the
optimal reserve price for one impression might depend on the outcome of
an auction for another item in the same set. We leave integrating reserve
prices in the multi-slot setting as an open question for future research.
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